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In  December  2004  at  the  annual  Central  Economic  Work  Conference,  China‘s  top  political 
leadership  agreed  to  fundamentally  alter  the  country‘s  growth  strategy  by  rebalancing  the 
sources  of  economic  growth.    In  place  of  investment  and  export-led  development,  they 
endorsed transitioning to a growth path that relied more on expanding domestic consumption.1 
Since then, China‘s top leadership, most notably Premier Wen Jiabao in his speeches to the 
annual meetings of the National People‘s Congress in the spring of 2006 and 2007 and at the 
Central Economic Work Conference in November- December 2006, has reiterated the goal of 
strengthening domestic consumption as a major source of economic growth.2  
China‘s decision to rebalance the sources of economic growth is laudable. It increases the 
likelihood of China sustaining its strong growth, achieving more rapid job creation, improving 
income distribution or at least slowing the pace of rising income inequality, and reducing its 
outsized increases in energy consumption of recent years. It also would reduce global economic 
imbalances  and  thus  lessen  the  risk  that  China  would  be  subject  to  protectionist  pressure, 
especially in Europe and the United States. 
But at least through the first half of 2007, China‘s economic growth has become even more 
imbalanced.    Although  the  growth  of  investment  expenditures  has  moderated  slightly,  net 
exports  of  goods  and  services have soared.    China‘s  external  surplus ballooned  to  a  global 
record in 2006 and continued to expand at a breakneck pace in the first half of 2007. Most 
importantly, both government and private consumption expenditure as a share of GDP have 
                            
* An earlier version of this paper, published as ―China: Rebalancing Economic Growth‖ in The China Balance Sheet in 
2007  and  Beyond  (Washington,  D.C.:  Center  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies  and  Peterson  Institute  for 
International Economics, April 2007), is available at: 
 http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/lardy0507.pdf. 
1 ―Central Economic Work Conference Convenes in Beijing December 3 to 5,‖ People’s Daily, December 6, 2004, 1, 
available at: http://www.people.com.cn. (accessed July 21, 2006). 
2 Wen Jiabao, ―Report on the Work of the Government,‖ People’s Daily, March 14, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn 
(accessed March 14, 2006).  New China News Agency, ―We must concretely grasp eight work items to do well in next 
year‘s  economic  work,‖  December  1,  2006  at  http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/3907488.html  (accessed 
December 12, 2006).  Wen Jiabao, ―Report on the Work of the Government,‖ March 5, 2007. Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      8      
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continued to fall since 2004. As a consequence, China also is falling short of meeting several of 
its key domestic economic objectives. 
The Sources of China’s Economic Growth 
China has been the fastest growing economy in the world over almost three decades, expanding 
at 10% a year in real terms, so real GDP in 2006 was about 13 times the level of 1978, when Deng 
Xiaoping  launched  China  on  the  path  of  economic  reform  (National  Bureau  of  Statistics  of 
China, 2006a, p.24; Xie Fuzhan, 2007). China is now the world‘s fourth largest economy and its 
third largest trader and highly likely, within a year, to move up a notch in each category. Given 
this stunning long-term success, why would China‘s leadership entertain the idea of shifting to 
a new growth paradigm? 
 
In all economies the expansion of output is the sum of the growth of consumption (both 
private and government) plus investment, plus net exports of goods and services. Expanding 
investment has been an increasingly important driver of China‘s growth. As shown in Figure 1, 
investment averaged 36% of GDP in the first decade or so of economic reform, relatively high 
by the standard of developing countries generally but not in comparison with China‘s East 
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Asian neighbors when their investment shares were at their highest.  But since the beginning of 
the 1990s, China‘s average investment rate has been higher and in 1993, and again in 2004-06, 
reached 43% of GDP, a level above the experience of China‘s East Asian neighbors in their high 
growth periods.3 Rising investment has been fueled by a rise in the national savings rate, which 
reached an unprecedented 52% of GDP in 2006.4  Rising investment was particularly important 
in 2001-2005, when it contributed just over half of China‘s growth (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2006b, p.70), an unusually high share by international standards. 
  
The growth of both household and government consumption (Figures 2 and 3) has been 
rapid in absolute terms throughout the reform period, but has lagged the underlying growth of 
the economy.  As shown in Figure 2, in the 1980s household consumption averaged slightly 
more  than  half  of  GDP.  This  share  fell  to  an  average  of  46%  in  the  1990s.  But  after  2000 
household consumption as a share of GDP fell sharply—and by 2006 accounted for only 36% of 
                            
3  All of the analysis of the expenditure components of GDP, i.e. consumption, investment, and net exports, is based 
on the revised GDP expenditure data for the years 1978 through 2005 released by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2006b) in late September 2006. Data for 2006 were released in May 2007.  
4 By definition, the national s avings rate is equal to investment as a share of GDP plus the current account as a 
percent of GDP. In China, these were 42.7% and 9.5% of GDP, respectively, in 2006.  
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GDP, by far the lowest share of any economy in the world.5 In the United States, household 
consumption  accounted  for  70%  of  GDP  in  the  same  year.  In  the United  Kingdom,  the 
household consumption share was 60%. In India, it was 61%. 
 
As  a  result  of  these  trends  in  household  and  government consumption,  the  relative 
importance of expanding consumption as a source of growth has diminished substantially, 
particularly compared with that of investment.  In th e first half of the 1980s consumption 
growth accounted for almost four -fifths of China‘s economic expansion, whereas in the five-
year period 2001-2005, this share fell by one-half to only two-fifths (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2006b, p.70).  
                            
5 The declining share of consumption in GDP is due to both a decline in household disposable income as a share of 
GDP  and  a  decline  in  consumption  as  a  share  of  disposable  income.    Some  analysts  believe  that  household 
consumption, particularly of services, is undercounted by China‘s National Bureau of Statistics and thus the share of 
household consumption in GDP is biased downwards.  If GDP was undercounted by 8% or 12%, and the entire 
increment  was  private  consumption  of  services,  household  consumption  would  have  constituted  42%  and  44%, 
respectively, of GDP in 2005 (Dragoneconomics Research & Advisory, 2007).  Even on these alternative assumptions, 
however,  private  consumption  as  a  share  of  GDP  would  be  unusually  low  by  international  standards.    These 
adjustments would also lower the investment share of GDP by 3 and 4 percentage points, respectively.  The higher 
consumption and lower investment share of GDP would mean the degree of internal imbalance is less than that 
reflected  in  the  official  data.    Note,  however,  that  on  these  alternative  assumptions,  China‘s  large  and  growing 
external imbalance would decline by only a few tenths of a percentage point. 
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In the last two years, the growth of net exports of goods and services has also become, for 
the first time in almost a decade, a major source of economic growth. As shown in Figure 4, the 
net  exports  of  goods  and  services  in  2005  more  than  doubled  to  reach  $124  billion  and 
accounted for one-quarter of the growth of the economy (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2006b, p.70). In 2006 they expanded further to $209 billion and accounted for about one-fifth of 
China‘s growth (State Administration of Foreign Exchange International Balance of Payments 
Analysis Small Group, 2007, p.8). 
 
In  sum,  despite  the  decision  of  the  Party  in  2004  to  stimulate  domestic  consumption 
demand, both household and government consumption have continued to fall as a share of 
GDP.  The government has been more successful in moderating the growth of investment and 
thus the contribution of investment to GDP expansion has fallen from the extraordinarily high 
levels of 2002-2003.  On the other hand net exports of goods and services have soared and their 
contribution to economic growth is currently unusually large leading, Premier Wen Jiabao at 
the National People‘s Congress in the spring of 2006 to opine that ―we must strive to reduce our 
excessively large trade surplus.‖ 
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Rethinking China’s Growth Strategy 
Several  factors  appear  to  underlie  the  December  2004  leadership  decision  to  rebalance  the 
sources  of  growth.  First,  investment-driven  growth,  or  what  the  Chinese  sometimes  call 
extensive growth, appeared to be leading to less efficient use of resources. By some metrics, as 
investment growth accelerated, the efficiency of resource use declined. Multifactor productivity 
growth, a critical contributor to economic expansion in all economies, averaged almost 4% per 
annum in the first 15 years of economic reform (1978–93) but slowed to only 3% since 1993 
(Kuijs and Wang, 2005, p.2). In short, as the investment share of GDP rose, the contribution of 
productivity improvements to GDP growth fell. In the words of Martin Wolf (2005), the chief 
economics commentator for the Financial Times, the surprising thing about the Chinese economy 
in recent years is not, as is so frequently asserted, how fast it is growing but rather, given the 
outsized share of output devoted to investment, how slowly it is growing.  
The second reason underlying the leadership decision to rebalance the sources of growth is 
the  desire  to  increase  personal  consumption  and  alleviate,  or  at  least  slow,  the  pace  of 
increasing  income  inequality.  In  2005,  personal  consumption in  China  was  30% less in  real 
terms than the level that would have been achieved if the household consumption share of GDP 
had remained at the 1990 level rather than falling by more than 10 percentage points. India 
offers a useful comparison. In 2004 China‘s per capita GDP was two and a half times that of 
India. But, because household consumption as a share of GDP was so much lower in China, per 
capita  consumption  exceeded  that  in  India  by  only  two-thirds.6  The ultimate purpose of 
economic growth everywhere is improvements in human welfare. By this standard, China is 
falling far below potential.  
Similarly, it appears that a portion of increasing income inequality in recent years can be 
attributed to the highly imbalanced regional pattern of growth.  The positive differential in the 
pace of growth in coastal provinces compared to the national average has increased along with 
the sharply higher pace of growth of foreign trade (particularly exports) that has occurred since 
2000.7  Moving away from heavy reliance on export led growth thus is consistent with Hu 
                            
6 Calculated on the basis of the Indian Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, National Account Statistics, 
available at: http://mospi.nic.in , IMF, International Financial Statistics; and National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(2006b, pp. 34, 36, 171). 
7   From 1978 through 2000 China‘s trade turnover (imports plus exports) measured in value terms expanded at an 
average rate of 15 per cent per year.  From 2000 through 2006 the pace accelerated to 25 per cent per year. Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      13      
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Jintao‘s  emphasis  on,  creating  a  more  ―harmonious  society,‖  which  requires,  among  other 
things, more balanced development between coastal and inland areas. 
Third,  China‘s  extensive  pattern  of  development  has  generated  very  modest  gains  in 
employment. Between 1978 and 1993, employment expanded by 2.5% per annum, but between 
1993  and  2004,  when  the  investment  share  of  GDP  was  much  higher  than  in  the  1980s, 
employment growth slowed to only slightly over 1% (Kuijs and Wang, 2005). The recent more 
capital intensive pattern of growth contributed to a slower pace of job creation for the simple 
reason that the steel and other investment goods industries employ far fewer workers per unit 
of  capital  than  do  consumer  goods  industries,  not  to  mention  the  even  less  favorable 
comparison with services. 
Another  reason  China‘s  leadership  wishes  to  transition  to  a  more  consumption-driven 
growth path is burgeoning energy consumption and its detrimental effects on the environment. 
Investment-driven growth requires the output of machinery and equipment, and the inputs to 
produce them, to grow much more rapidly than the output of consumer goods. Rapid growth 
of output of investment goods, in turn, increases the demand for energy disproportionately. 
China‘s energy elasticity of GDP growth (the number of units of energy required to produce an 
additional unit of output) averaged a modest 0.6 in the 1980s and 1990s, leading over time to a 
substantial reduction in the amount of energy required to produce each unit of GDP. But this 
ratio rose to an average of 1 in 2001-05 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006a, p.147).  
Although China continues to achieve energy efficiency gains in the production of virtually all 
products, from 2001 through 2005 these gains were no longer sufficient to offset the effect of the 
rapid  expansion  of  the  most  energy  intensive  sectors  of  manufacturing,  including  steel, 
chemicals and cement.8 
Since two-thirds of China‘s energy comes from coal, the burgeoning demand for energy 
generated by capital-intensive growth boosted coal consumption by two-thirds between 2000 
and 2005. Coal consumption reached more than 2 billion tons in 2005, almost twice the level of 
coal consumption of the United States, even though China‘s economy is only one-sixth the size 
of the United States. As a result, China is now the second largest emitter of greenhouse gas and 
is home to 16 of the 20 cities with the worst air pollution on the globe. As a result of the massive 
                            
8  For example, in 2003 overall efficiency gains were the equivalent of about 30% of the adverse effect on energy 
efficiency stemming from the structural shift toward the most energy intensive subsectors of the industrial sector (Jin, 
2006). Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      14      
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increase in coal consumption, the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) reported that 
rather than cutting sulfur dioxide emissions in 2000–2005 by 10% to 18 million tons as planned, 
by 2005 emissions rose to 25.5 million tons, 42% above the goal.9  
A fifth factor motivating China‘s leadership to seek a transition to a more consumption-
driven growth pattern is less obvious but still important. Excessive reliance on investment and 
net exports to drive growth in recent years threatens to undo some of the progress China has 
made over the past six years in developing a commercially oriented banking system. A critical 
component  of  this  process has been  the injection  of  almost  4  trillion  renminbi  (RMB) ($500 
billion), mostly from the government, to cover past loan losses and to raise capital adequacy to 
meet prudential standards (Ma Guonan, 2006).  
 
Excess  investment  in  some  sectors  could  eventually  lead  to  excess  capacity  and  falling 
prices, which could create a new wave of nonperforming loans that would erode the substantial 
balance sheet improvements of state-owned banks over the past few years and could push some 
city  commercial  banks,  which  on  average  are  far  weaker,  into  insolvency.  The  National 
Development and Reform Commission (2006) in its report to the National People‘s Congress 
                            
9 Oster, 2006. 
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acknowledged that ―adverse effects of surplus production capacity in some industries have 
begun to emerge. Prices for the products of these industries dropped and inventories grew, 
corporate profits shrank and losses mounted, and potential financial risk has increased.‖ This 
analysis is supported by the rapid increase in the magnitude of financial losses of unprofitable 
industrial enterprises.  As shown in Figure 5, after several years of stability, losses have more 
than doubled since 2003.  Since net profits of all enterprises rose sharply in this period (see 
Figure 7) there apparently has been a sharp increase in the dispersion of the profitability of 
China‘s industrial firms over the past three years. 
The absence of significantly rising non-performing loans in the banking system in the past 
few years is not necessarily a sign that all is well, since China has had four consecutive years of 
double-digit  growth  and  aggregate  corporate  profits  have  been  rising.  Moreover,  based  on 
China‘s exploding current account surplus in recent years (see Figure 6 and related discussion 
below) the RMB appears to be increasingly undervalued, contributing to the growth of profits 
in the tradable goods sector, i.e., manufacturing.  Distress in the banking system could emerge, 
however,  either  from  a  slowdown  in  economic  growth  over  the  next  few  years  or  from  a 
significant appreciation of the currency.   
A  final  factor  underlining  the  leadership‘s  desire  to  transition  to  more  consumption-
oriented growth is that excess reliance on a growing trade surplus raises the prospect of a 
protectionist backlash in the United States, Europe, and other important markets for Chinese 
exports. China‘s central bank was perhaps the first to explicitly acknowledge this factor in its 
Report on the Implementation of Monetary Policy Report 2005Q2, in which it candidly stated that 
China‘s excessive trade surplus ―will escalate trade frictions‖ (People‘s Bank of China Monetary 
Policy Analysis Small Group, 2005, p.28). 
In sum, for a variety of reasons China‘s top political leadership and its leading economic 
advisory institutions by late 2004 came to the view that sustaining long-term rapid growth 
required a significant modification of the underlying growth strategy. 
Implications for the Global Economy 
China‘s new growth strategy, if realized, would have positive implications not only for China, 
but also for the global economy. As shown in Figure 6, China‘s current account surplus has 
soared in recent years. In 2006 it reached $249 billion making China, for the first time, the 
world‘s largest global current account surplus country. China now is a major contributor to Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      16      
 
China's Agricultural Trade: Issues and Prospects 
global economic imbalances, along with the United States, which has the world‘s largest current 
account deficit. China‘s successful transition to a pattern of growth driven more by domestic 
consumption demand necessarily entails a reduction of China‘s national saving rate relative to 
its  investment  rate.  That,  in  turn,  would  reduce  China‘s  current  account  surplus.  Thus 
rebalancing of China‘s economic growth would contribute to a reduction of global economic 
imbalances as well. 
 
Promoting Consumption Driven Growth 
Promoting domestic demand as a source of economic expansion requires that the growth of 
household and/or government consumption increase relative to that of the combined growth of 
investment and net exports. Policies to promote consumption fall into three broad categories: 
fiscal,  exchange  rate,  and  financial.  Fiscal  policy  options  include  cutting  personal  taxes, 
increasing government consumption expenditures, i.e., government noninvestment outlays, or 
introducing  a  dividend  tax  on  state-owned  companies.  Appreciation  of  the  RMB  would 
simultaneously reduce net exports and allow the government greater flexibility in the use of 
interest rate policy (Goodfriend and Prasad, 2006). As will be argued below, higher real interest 
rates are almost certainly necessary to reduce China‘s excessive rate of investment, which in 
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turn is a prerequisite to a successful transition to a more consumption-driven growth path. 
Finally,  financial  reform  could  increase  interest  income  received  by  households,  potentially 
raising household disposable income and thus consumption. 
Fiscal  Policy:  The  most  obvious  policy  choice  in  economies  seeking  to  stimulate 
consumption is to cut personal taxes, thus raising disposable income and personal consumption 
expenditures.  In addition, governments can increase budgetary expenditures, notably those on 
health, education, welfare, and pensions, to add to domestic consumption demand. There is 
enormous scope to do so in China, since governments at all levels combined spend only 3% of 
GDP on these programs (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006b, p.288).10  The low level of 
social expenditure is reflected in the very limited share of the population that has health, 
unemployment and workers‘ compensation insurance. In 2003, for example, in urban areas only 
about one-half of the population was covered by basic health insurance, and in rural areas less 
than  one-fifth  of  the  population  was  covered  by  a  cooperative  health  insurance  program 
initiated on a trial basis in 2002 (OECD, 2005, p.185). In 2005, only 14% of China‘s workforce 
was  covered  by  unemployment  insurance,  and  only  11%  were  covered  by  workers‘ 
compensation (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006a, pp. 43, 201). In the same year the 
pension scheme covered 131.2 million workers, only 17% of those employed, plus 43.7 million 
retirees (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006a, pp. 43, 201). 
The  government  has  considerable  potential  to  increase  its  expenditures  on  healthcare, 
unemployment compensation, and pensions without raising taxes on households, which likely 
would depress household consumption, offsetting to some degree the increase in government 
consumption.  The  government  could  simply  reduce  its  own  investment  expenditures  and 
reallocate the funds to consumption.11 The government itself directly undertakes about 5% of all 
investment, an amount equivalent to a little over 2% of GDP (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2006a, p.52). In addition, the government budget provides ―capital transfers,‖ that are 
used to finance additional investment expenditures.12  For 2003, the most recent year for which 
China‘s National Bureau of Statistics has released the relevant data, these capital transfers were 
the equivalent of 8% of all fixed investment (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006b, pp. 
                            
10 Excluding capital expenditures. 
11 This reallocation, of course, would reduce government savings since the latter are defined as current revenues less 
current, i.e., noninvestment, outlays.  
12 Kuijs (2006, p.7) believes these funds are transferred to state-owned enterprises in electric power, water, transport, 
and other infrastructure sectors. Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      18      
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88-89).  Thus  the  government‘s  direct  and  indirect  investment  outlays  combined  amount  to 
about  6%  of  GDP.  A  reduction  in  the  government‘s  direct  investment  and  cutting  capital 
transfers would free up resources to increase government consumption, i.e., outlays for health, 
education, welfare, and pensions. That would contribute significantly to a rebalancing of the 
structure of demand, away from investment and toward consumption. 
Increased  government  consumption  expenditures  would  also  indirectly  contribute  to 
increasing household consumption as a share of GDP by reducing the household savings rate, 
which  has  increased  significantly  since  the  1980s  and  has  been  running  at  about  25%  of 
disposable income since 2000 (Kuijs, 2006). One reason for the rise in the savings rate in the 
1990s was the reduction in the level of social services provided by the government and state-
owned enterprises.  For example, the share of total health outlays borne by individuals on an 
out-of-pocket basis increased from around 20% in 1978 to a peak of 60% in 2001 (IMF, 2006, 
p.49; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005, p.770; 2006b, p.882).  
Increased  provision  of  health  care,  unemployment  compensation,  and  workers‘ 
compensation  through  the  government  budget  can  be  expected  to  reduce  household 
precautionary saving. As families gain confidence that the government will provide more of 
these services they will reduce their own saving voluntarily, i.e., increase consumption as a 
share of their own disposable income. Similarly greater government provision of educational 
services  and  old  age  support  could  lead  to  a  reduction  in  savings  associated  with  lifecycle 
events, such as children‘s education and retirement. 
In other countries, increased government provision of health services has stimulated an 
increase in household consumption (China Economic Research and Advisory Program, 2005). 
For example, the introduction of National Health Insurance in Taiwan, which raised the fraction 
of the insured population from 57% in 1994 to 97% in 1998, substantially reduced household 
uncertainty  about  future  health  expenditures  and  thus  stimulated  increased  consumption 
outlays.  Households  that  previously  enjoyed  no  health  insurance  coverage  increased  their 
consumption expenditures by an average of over 4% (Chou, Liu, and Hammitt, 2002, p.1889).13 
Thus,  China‘s  transition  to  a  more  consumption-driven  growth  path  needs  to  start  with 
increased government consumption expenditures but with time is likely to be reinforced by 
changes in household consumption and saving decisions. 
                            
13 Consumption increased by 2.6% in households where one spouse was not in the labor force or unemployed and by 
5.7% in households where both spouses worked.  Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      19      
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Finally, corporate tax policy should contribute importantly to the rebalancing of China‘s 
sources of economic growth. As shown in Figure 7, from 1999 through 2006, profits of industrial 
enterprises in China soared from 3% to over 10% of GDP (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2005,  p.  494;  People‘s  Bank  of  China  Monetary  Policy  Analysis  Small  Group,  2006,  p.  33). 
Although these profits are subject to China‘s corporate income tax, estimated retained after-tax 
earnings of industrial firms in 2006 amounted to 7.8% of GDP, compared with an estimated 
1.5% in 1998.14  In addition, industrial firms retain depreciation funds that amount to another 
6% to 7% of GDP (Kuijs, Mako, and Zhang , 2005).  
Unfortunately, in state-owned firms these funds are not  subject to a significant rate of 
return test prior to being reinvested. The reason is that the only available legal alternative to re-
investment is low yielding bank deposits. Taking into account the relevant measure of inflation, 
                            
14  Before  tax  profits  of  industrial  firms  with  annual  sales  above  RMB5  million  were  RMB  1,900  billion  in  2006 
(People‘s Bank of China Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, 2007, p.30). In 2004 the profits of all industrial firms 
exceeded those of firms with sales of more than RMB5 million by 15%.  Assuming this ratio was unchanged in 2006 
profits of all industrial firms in 2006 can be estimated at RMB 2,185 billion. China‘s three largest oil producers are 
subject to a windfall profits tax, which amounted to RMB41.71 billion 2006. Profits also are subject to the corporate 
income tax.  While the statutory rate is 33%, various tax waivers reduce the applied rate to 24% for most domestic 
enterprises (Zhu Zhe, 2006). Assuming the average corporate tax rate on domestic firms is 24%, after-tax profits can 
be estimated at RMB 1,628 billion or 7.8% of reported 2007 GDP of RMB20, 941 billion.   
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the real after-tax rate of return on corporate deposits is typically negative.15 Given a negative 
real rate of return on deposits, it is rational for enterprise managers to reinvest all retained 
profits and depreciation funds —even  when  the  investment  projects  have  slightly  negative 
anticipated rates of return—or to channel them illegally into potentially higher return stock 
investments. 
Given  the  strong  upward  trend  in  profits  as  a  share  of  GDP  since  1999  and  apparent 
upward trend in depreciation funds as a share of GDP as well, retained earnings have become 
an increasingly important source of investment financing in China‘s corporate sector and have 
contributed to the rising investment share of GDP in recent years.  
For a number of years, the authorities have discussed requiring state-owned enterprises to 
pay dividends to their owner—the government (Kuijs, Mako, and Zhang, 2005). This policy has 
the potential simultaneously to reduce the pace at which investment grows, or at least subject 
investment to a more demanding rate of return hurdle, and to provide the government with 
additional resources that could be used to enhance government-provided social services.  
Exchange Rate Policy: Exchange rate policy should be a third element supporting China‘s 
transition to a more consumption-driven growth path for two reasons. First, through its affect 
on relative prices, appreciation of the RMB will reduce the growth of exports and increase the 
growth of imports, reducing China‘s external imbalance.  Second, China‘s highly undervalued 
exchange rate constrains the independence of monetary policy. China‘s central bank has had 
some  success  in  sterilizing  large  foreign  capital  inflows,  a  key  element  in  its  program  of 
controlling  the  growth  of  monetary  aggregates  and  bank  credit.    But  it  has  generally  been 
reluctant to raise domestic interest rates since that would reduce the carry costs of foreigners 
moving money into China in anticipation of further RMB appreciation.  Since lower carry costs 
increase the profits to be gained from any RMB appreciation, the authorities fear that raising 
domestic  interest  rates  could  cause  capital  inflows  to  become  unmanageably  large.  Fixed 
nominal domestic interest rates on loans in 2002–03, when domestic price inflation was rising, 
led to a sharp decline in and ultimately to negative real interest rates on loans. Between the first 
                            
15 For example, effective August 19, 2006, the People‘s Bank of China raised the nominal interest rate on a  
one-year term corporate deposit to 2.52%. The corporate goods price index in August 2006 was up 2.9% compared 
with August 2005, making the real return –0.38%. Nominal returns on short-term deposits were less than 2.52%, as 
low as 0.72% for demand deposits, making the real return on deposits of less than one year as low as –2.18%.  The 
most recent adjustment was effective May 19, 2007 when the one-year deposit rate was raised to 3.06%.  But the 
corporate goods price index for May 2007 was up 5.1% compared with May 2006, making the real return -2.04%.  The 
demand deposit rate was left unchanged at 0.72% so by mid May the real return fell to -4.38.  In short deposit rates 
for corporates are becoming increasingly negative in real terms.  Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      21      
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half of 2002 through the third quarter of 2004, the real interest rate on loans fell by 13 percentage 
points, from almost 9% to    –4%.16 That fueled a very large increase in the demand for ba nk 
loans and thus a sharp increase in capital formation.  
A more flexible exchange rate policy would allow the central bank greater flexibility in 
setting domestic interest rates and thus increase the potential to mitigate macroeconomic cycles 
by raising lending rates to moderate investment booms. That would lead, on average, to a lower 
rate of investment. A reduction in the rate of investment is a critical component of the policies to 
transition  to  a  more  consumption-driven  growth  path.  In  the  absence  of  a  reduction  in 
investment, increased consumption demand would lead to inflation. 
Financial Reform: The decline in household consumption as a share of GDP, shown in 
Figure 2, reflects not only an increase in savings as a share of household disposable income but 
also in a decline in the share of disposable income in GDP.  Between 1993 and 2003 household 
disposable income as a share of GDP fell by 4.8 percentage points.17 
Part  of  the  explanation  of  this  decline  may  be  increasing  financial  repression.    China‘s 
financial sector has been undergoing far reaching reform for more than a decade, suggesting 
that the degree of repression has eased in recent years.  However, from the point of view of 
households this appears not to be the case.  As shown in Figure 8, although household deposits 
in the banking system as a share of GDP almost doubled between 1993 and 2003, the stream of 
pre-tax interest earnings generated by these savings declined from an average of about 5% in 
1992-95  to  only  2.2%  of  GDP  in  2003.  The  declining  contribution  of  interest  earnings  to 
disposable income was even greater since the government introduced a 20% tax on interest 
income in 1999.  Taking this factor into account, the decline in the contribution of after tax 
interest income to household disposable income over this period accounts for two-thirds of the 
decline  in  household  disposable  income  as  a  share  of  GDP.  More  importantly,  if  interest 
earnings  after  1995  had  grown  in  line  with  the  stock  of  household  bank  deposits  and  the 
government had not introduced a tax on interest income, the contribution of interest income to 
household disposable income by 2003 would have been 7.5% of GDP, 5.7 percentage points 
greater than the actual contribution.  
                            
16 The real interest rate is calculated as the one-year lending rate minus the inflation rate reflected in the corporate 
goods price index. The latter index is compiled and published by the People‘s Bank of China. 
17 Calculated from data in the flow of funds accounts reported in the annual  China Statistical Yearbook.  These data 
were first released for 1993 and 2003 is the most recent year available. Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      22      
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China’s Pursuit of Consumption Driven Growth  
Even before the 2004 Central Economic Work Conference, the government sought to raise farm 
incomes by reducing the agricultural tax levied on farm income (Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Agriculture, and State Tax Bureau, 2004). In 2004 the tax, which had been set at 8.4% of 
average  yields, was  eliminated  in  two  provinces  and  reduced  by  3  percentage  points  in  11 
provinces and by 1 percentage point in all other provinces.18 By the end of 2005 the government 
had eliminated the tax in 28 provincial-level administrative units and had reduced it to less than 
2% in the remaining three provinces, where the tax was eliminated entirely in 2006 (State Tax 
Bureau, 2005b).  This early initiative was followed in 2006 with a doubling of the amount of  
income exempt from the personal income tax levied on wage earners.  
The central government also has encouraged local governments to raise the minimum wage 
in urban areas, potentially increasing the consumption of low-income workers. 
                            
18 In 2004 the tax was eliminated in Jilin and Heilongqiang provinces, cut by 3 percentage points in 11 other grain-
growing provinces (Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and 
Sichuan), and reduced by 1 percentage point in all other provinces. 
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All of these initiatives, however, are modest. Agricultural taxes collected fell from RMB33.7 
billion in 2003 to RMB19.79 billion in 2004 and then to only RMB1.279 billion in 2005 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005, p.281; 2006a, p.75). The tax burden on farmers was reduced 
by RMB23.4 billion in 2004 and an additional RMB22 billion in 2005 (Ministry of Finance, 2005; 
State  Tax  Bureau,  2005b).  However,  RMB23.4  billion  is  the  equivalent  of  only  1%  of  rural 
consumption  expenditure  or  0.1%  of  GDP  in  2004.  Similarly,  the  State  Tax  Bureau  (2005a) 
reported that raising the personal income tax exemption would reduce the tax take by RMB28 
billion in 2006, only 0.13% of GDP.19  
Finally, it is unlikely that the increase in minimum wages that went into effect on July 1, 
2006  in  mos t  administrative  jurisdictions  had  a  significant  positive  effect  on  household 
consumption expenditures. There are two reasons for this. First, the Regulations on the Minimum 
Wage  of  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Labor  and  Social  Security  (2003),  give  local  governments 
considerable  leeway  in  setting  the  minimum  wage.  In  practice,  in  most  jurisdictions,  the 
minimum wage is only about one-fifth to one-quarter the average local wage.20 Second, the 
share of the workforce earning the minimum wage appears to be quite sma ll. In Beijing, for 
example, minimum wage workers accounted for only 2.4% of the workforce in 2002.21 Given the 
low ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage and the small share of the workforce 
earning the minimum wage, the 6.5% rise in the capital‘s minimum wage in 2003 could not have 
had more than a miniscule effect on the total wage bill.22  
In summary, the cuts in taxes on rural and urban incomes instituted by the central 
government beginning in 2004 and the increases in minimum wage levels combined  raised 
household disposable income by less than 0.5% of GDP by 2006 and are unlikely to lead to 
significantly higher levels of household consumption expenditures. The cuts in taxes on urban 
and rural incomes are too small, and in rural areas they have been  at least partially offset by 
increases in other taxes that fall partially on farmers.23 
                            
19 Based on the preliminary 2006 GDP figure of RMB20, 941 billion reported in January 2007 (Xie Fuzhan, 2007.) 
20 In Beijing the minimum wage was 25.5 and 23.5% of the average wage in 2002 and 2003, respectively. In 2004, in 
Shenzhen, the minimum wage was 18% of the average local wage (China‘s highest).   
21  China  Statistical  Information  Net,  ―Wages  of  Beijing  Workers  and  Staff  Increase  Steadily;  Differentials  Across 
Industrial Branches Expand,‖ 
www.hebei.gov.cn/economy/stat/column_detail.jsp?id=8515&subjectname=%E7%BB%9f (accessed July 10, 2006).  
22 In 2002 the share of Beijing‘s wage income earned by minimum wage workers can be estimated as 0.6% of total 
wage income (0.25 x 0.024). Assuming that it had no effect on the number of minimum wage workers, the increase in 
the minimum wage would have raised total wage income by 0.04%.  
23 For details, see Lardy (2007). Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      24      
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On the other hand, central government expenditures on selected health, education, and 
other social programs have increased quite significantly in the past two years. The centerpiece 
of  this  effort  is  Premier  Wen  Jiabao‘s  program  to  create  a  ―new  socialist  countryside.‖  The 
program entails increased subsidies for grain producers, designed to raise the incomes of some 
of China‘s poorest farmers; expanding the coverage of the rural cooperative medical system, 
which was first rolled out on a trial basis in 2002; and eliminating educational fees for rural 
primary education.  
The increase in expenditures on some of these programs is impressive.24 Outlays by the 
central government on the rural cooperative medical system rose seven-fold to RMB4.27 billion 
in 2006 allowing the number of rural residents covered by the program to more than double to 
410 million.  The government has pledged to make the program available in 80% of all 
administrative units by the end of 2007, an increase of almost seven-fold compared to 2004.  The 
government has budgeted RMB220 billion ($27.5 billion) over five years (2006-2010) to provide 
free rural primary school education, a significant commitment. Expenditures on this initiative in 
2006 were RMB36.6 billion, allowing the government to eliminate tuition and miscellaneous 
school fees for 52 million students in 12 western provinces. The program will reach a total of 150 
million students in 2007 as central and eastern provinces are brought into the program. 
Government outlays on health expanded by an average of one -quarter in both 2005 and 
2006, a substantial acceleration compared with an annual expansion of only 15% in the previous 
four years.  In 2007 the government launched a pilot program to provide basic medial insurance 
for urban residents who are either unemployed or do not receive medical insurance through 
their employers. 
Despite  the initiatives summarized  above,  combined  government  expenditures  at  the 
national and sub-national level on education and public health rose by only 0.3% of GDP 
between 2004 and 2006. The apparent contradiction between the large increases in selective 
education and health outlays by the central government and the much more  modest pace of 
increase in total outlays is explained by the overwhelmingly dominant role of provincial and 
local  governments.  In  2005,  for  example,  sub -national  governments  financed  94%  of  all 
government spending on education and 98% of all government spe nding on public health. 
                            
24 Data in the paragraphs that follow are taken from speeches presented at the National People‘s Congress in Beijing 
in early March 2007. Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      25      
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Thus, unless sub-national governments increase the priority they assign to funding education 
and health programs, total expenditures on these programs are unlikely to rise significantly. 
Corporate  tax  policy  is  not  yet  facilitating  a  rebalancing  of  the  sources  of  growth.    In 
September  2006  Li  Rongrong,  chairman  of  China‘s  State-Owned  Asset  Supervision  and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), announced that the government would begin collecting 
such dividends in 2007.25  But until the details of this program are clear it is premature to judge 
its effects.  First, the magnitude of required dividend payments has not been disclosed.  If all 
state-owned and state controlled industrial companies were to pay half their after-tax income as 
dividends, this would have amounted to 1.5% of GDP in 2006. 26  Additional dividends could 
also be collected from state-owned firms in the construction and services sectors.  However, Mr. 
Li indicated that the dividend tax would be imposed only on industrial ente rprises directly 
administered by SASAC in Beijing, suggesting that the magnitude of dividend payments could 
be modest.   
More importantly, Mr. Li has argued that dividend payments would not be made to the 
Ministry of Finance, where they would be subject to   budgetary allocation and thus would 
potentially be a source of funding for additional government provided social services. Rather, 
he has asserted that dividend payments would be made directly to SASAC, which he says he 
would use to finance investment out lays.  If this approach were to be adopted, a dividend 
policy would not reduce the corporate savings rate and would not contribute to a rebalancing of 
the sources of economic growth.  
In July 2005 the Chinese authorities revalued the RMB by 2.1% vis -à-vis the United States 
dollar and announced that the currency could fluctuate by up to 0.3% per day and that the RMB 
would be managed with reference to a basket of currencies, rather than simply being pegged to 
the United States dollar. These reforms could have led to an appreciation that would slow the 
growth of China‘s external surplus and give the People‘s Bank of China greater flexibility in 
adjusting interest rates.  
                            
25 Carew (2006). 
26 Profits of all industrial firms sector in the first half are estimated to be RMB 2,185 billion (note 14). I assume that 
41% accrued to state-owned and state-controlled firms, the share they accounted  for in 2005 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2005,pp. 491 & 497; 2006b, p.509). Deducting the windfall profits tax of state-owned oil companies 
and the average corporate income tax of 24% (note 14) results in an estimate of after -tax profits of RMB650 billion or 
3.1% of GDP.  Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      26      
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But to date China‘s external surplus has grown at an accelerating rate despite a cumulative 
appreciation almost 8% nominally vis-à-vis the dollar and 6% on a real effective exchange rate 
(RER) basis. 27   
Why  have  China‘s  net  exports  as  a  share  of  GDP  almost  tripled  since  2004  while  its 
exchange  rate,  on  a  real  trade-weighted  basis  has  appreciated  by  about  3%  per  year?  One 
hypothesis is that the RER of the RMB, as calculated by the IMF and JP Morgan and other 
investment banks, understates China‘s growing competitiveness in international markets.  All 
of these institutions calculate the real exchange rate by comparing the rate of movement of 
consumer prices in China and in its trading partners. For example, if while the nominal effective 
exchange  rate  of  the  RMB  was  unchanged  China  experienced  one  percentage  point  more 
consumer price inflation than the average of its trading partners, the calculated RER of the RMB 
would show an appreciation of 1%.   
The problem is that the CPI appears to be a poor measure of the prices of China‘s exports.  
Despite an 8% nominal appreciation of the RMB vis-à-vis the United States‘ dollar, from June 
2005 through May 2007, the price of Chinese goods imported into the United States fell 1%.28  
Available data do not suggest that Chinese exporters cut their profit margins in order to avoid 
passing through the RMB appreciation to United States consumers.  The most likely explanation 
is  that  productivity  growth  in  China‘s  export  sector  has  been  sufficiently  high  that  firms 
producing  exports  could  absorb  the  effect  of  the  rising  value  of  the  RMB  on  their  export 
earnings.  Productivity growth over the two year period must have been 9% or about 4.4% per 
year in order to allow prices of Chinese exports in the United States to decline by 1% in the face 
of a nominal 8% increase in the value of the RMB vis-à-vis the dollar.  Over this period, prices in 
the United States were rising by about 3% per year.  If Chinese prices of export goods were 
declining by a little over 4% per year while prices of United States goods were rising by 3%, the 
Chinese currency would have needed to appreciate in nominal terms by a little over 7% per 
year to maintain the initial level of competitiveness of Chinese exports in the United States 
market.  But nominal appreciation of the RMB against the United States dollar was only a little 
over half that pace so Chinese goods became more competitive. Since the RMB on a nominal 
                            
27  An effective exchange rate is a weighted average of the bilateral exchange rates with each of a country‘s trading 
partners where the weights are the trade shares of each trading partner.  A real exchange rate is one adjusted for 
relative price changes at home and abroad, typically based on consumer price data.  JP Morgan‘s index (1994 = 100) 
of China‘s RER moved from 120.60 in June 2005 to 127.79 in May 2007, an appreciation of 6%. 
28  U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  ―Import/Export  Price  Indexes,‖  available  at: 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv, accessed June 18, 2007. Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      27      
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bilateral basis actually depreciated 2% against the Euro, the increase in Chinese competitiveness 
was even greater in Euro-land, now China‘s largest export market. 
In short, the Chinese government has not yet used exchange rate policy to help rebalance 
economic  growth.    Appreciation  of  the  RMB  has  been  far  too  modest,  so  China‘s  external 
surplus  is  now  at  a  global  record  and  continues  to  expand  rapidly.    The  modest  pace  of 
appreciation  reflects  continued  massive  government  intervention  in  the  foreign  exchange 
market, which has meant that the potential for the value of the currency to move by as much as 
0.3% per day (0.5% per day starting mid-May 2007) has been entirely theoretical.  Indeed, in the 
first  quarter  of  2007  the  pace  of  intervention  by  the  authorities  increased  dramatically, 
suggesting that the misalignment of the currency is increasing rather than decreasing.  The 
continuing and increasing level of intervention directly contradicts the People‘s Bank of China 
July 2005 announcement that emphasized market forces and specifically stated that supply and 
demand would play an increasing role in determining the exchange rate. 
In the absence of flow of funds data for the years since 2003 it is difficult to know whether 
financial  reform  in  recent  years  has  reduced  financial  repression  and  allowed  households‘ 
interest income to rise.  The interest rate households receive on demand deposits has been 
unchanged at 0.72% since February 2002, but inflation as measured by the CPI has ticked up 4 
percentage  points  from  -1%  in  2002  to  3%  in  the  first  half  of  2007.    The  central  bank  has 
increased deposit rates paid by banks on term deposits but by far less than the increase in 
inflation.  For example, the one-year term deposit rate as of May 2007 was 3.06%, an increase of 
only  1.08  percentage  points  since  February  2002.    Given  the  decline  in  real  interest  rates 
available to households the contribution of interest income to household disposable income as a 
percentage of GDP probably has continued to decline since 2003.   
Conclusion 
China has failed to initiate the transition to more consumption-driven growth - indeed growth 
has  actually  become  even  more  unbalanced  since  2004.  In  2005-06,  the  pace  of  investment 
demand moderated slightly, as reflected in a one-half percentage point reduction in investment 
as a share of GDP in 2005 and 2006 compared to 2004.  But China has become increasingly 
dependent on a growing trade surplus to sustain high growth.  Net exports jumped from 2.5% 
of GDP in 2004 to 7.3% of GDP in 2006 and accounted for almost 1/4 of China‘s economic 
growth  over  the  two-year  period.    Over  the  same  period  household  and  government Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      28      
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consumption declined by 4.3 percentage points of GDP.   Similarly,  Premier  Wen  Jiabao 
acknowledged that while energy consumption per unit of GDP fell by 1.2 percentage points that 
this was far below the goal of reducing the consumption of energy per unit of output by 4% 
annually through 2010. 
Government policy has failed to put China onto a new growth path for several reasons. 
First,  the  tax  cuts  on  agricultural  and  wage  income  have  raised  disposable  income  only 
microscopically  and  thus  have  little  potential  to  increase  household  consumption.  While 
government funding for a few high profile health and education programs increased rapidly, 
overall the spending on these programs increased by only 0.3 percentage points of GDP over 
the past two years, an amount so modest that it does not yet appear to have led to a reduction in 
the precautionary demand for savings on the part of China‘s households. Finally, on the fiscal 
front the government has yet to institute a corporate dividend tax and, since the design of the 
program has not been revealed, it is not clear that it will contribute to economic rebalancing 
when it is levied.  
Similarly,  RMB  appreciation  has  been  so  modest  (indeed  appropriately  measured  the 
currency  may  have  depreciated)  that  exchange  rate  policy  has  not  contributed  to  reducing 
China‘s growing external surplus.  Moreover, the substantial undervaluation of the currency 
continues to limit the independence of monetary policy, effectively precluding the higher real 
domestic interest rates that are needed to reduce the implicit subsidy to investment.  Indeed, 
recent  increases  in  nominal  interest  rates  on  corporate  loans  have  been  less  than  the  price 
increases faced by corporates, so the real corporate borrowing rate has declined and is now very 
low in real terms.29 Thus the government depends mainly on administrative intervention by the 
central bank to control the growth of bank lending.  Equally important, the real interest rate on 
corporate bank deposits is increasingly negative, almost insuring that state -owned companies 
reinvest all of their retained earnings, even when the projects are not expected to be profitable.   
Finally,  government  imposed  interest  rates  on  savings  deposits  provide  ever  more 
penurious real returns to households, depressing the rate of growth of household disposable 
income compared to what would occur in a more liberalized financial environment.  
                            
29 Effective May 19, 2007, the central bank raised the benchmark rate on a one-year corporate loan by 18 basis points 
to 6.57%. The corporate goods price index in May 2007 rose 5.1% over a year ago, making the real lending rate faced 
by corporate borrowers only 1.5%, an extraordinarily low rate in an economy growing at 11%. 
 
 Lardy    Chap.1: China’s Consumption      29      
 
China's Agricultural Trade: Issues and Prospects 
All  of  these  factors  suggest  that  China‘s  transition  toward  more  consumption-driven 
growth  will  require  more  vigorous  government  action  in  all  three  policy  domains—fiscal, 
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